Clarke's fünfte Entgegnung
As1 Multitudes of Words are neither an Argument of clear Ideas in the Writer, nor a proper means of conveying clear Notions to the Reader; I shall endeavour to give a distinct Answer to this Fifth Paper, as briefly as I can.
1-20. There is no*1[2]) similitude between a Balance being moved by Weights or Impulse, and a Mind moving itself, or acting upon the View of certain Motives. The Difference is, that the one is entirely passive; which is being subject to absolute Necessity: The other not only is acted upon, but acts also; which is the essence of Liberty. To*2[3]) suppose that an equal apparent Goodness in different Ways of acting, takes away from the Mind all Power of Acting at all, as an equality of Weights keeps a Balance necessarily at Rest; is denying the Mind to have in itself a Principle of Action; and is confounding the Power of Acting, with the Impression made upon the Mind by the Motive, wherein the Mind is purely passive. The Motive, or thing considered as in View, is something extrinsick to the Mind: The impression made upon the Mind by That Motive, is the perceptive Quality, in which the Mind is passive: The Doing of any thing, upon and after, or in consequence of, that perception; this is the Power of Self-Motion, or Action: Which, in All animate Agents, is Spontaneity; and, in moral Agents, is what we properly call Liberty. The not carefully distinguishing these things, but confounding*3[4]) the Motive with the Principle of Action, and denying the Mind to have any Principle of Action besides the Motive, (when indeed in receiving the impression of the Motive, the Mind is purely passive;) This, I say, is the Ground of the whole Error; and leads Men to think that the Mind is no more Active, than a Balance would be with the Addition of a Power of Perception: Which is wholly taking away the very Notion of Liberty. A Balance pushed on Both sides with equal force, or pressed on Both sides with equal Weights, cannot move at all: And supposing the Balance indued with a Power of Perception, so as to be sensible of its own incapacity to move; or so as to deceive itself with an imagination that it moves itself, when indeed it is only moved; it would be exactly in the same state, wherein this learned Author supposes a free Agent to be in all cases of absolute Indifference. But the Fallacy plainly lies here: The Balance, for want of having in itself a Principle or Power of Action, cannot move at all when the Weights are equal: But a Free Agent, when there appear two, or more, perfectly alike reasonable ways of acting; has still within itself, by virtue of its Self-Motive Principle, a Power of acting: And it may have very strong and good Reasons, not to forbear acting at all; when yet there may be no possible reason to determine one particular Way of doing the thing, to be better than another. To affirm therefore*1[5]), that, supposing two different ways of placing certain particles of Matter were equally good and reasonable, God could neither wisely nor possibly place them in either of those ways, for want of a sufficient Weight to determine him which way he should chuse; is making God not an Active, but a Passive Being: Which is, not to be a God, or Governor, at all. And for denying the Possibility of the Supposition, that there may be two equal Parts of Matter, which may with equal fitness be transposed in situation; no other reason can be alleyed, but this*2[6]) petitio Principii, that Then this Learned Writer's Notion of a sufficient Reason would not be well-grounded. For otherwise, how can any Man say, that 'tis*3[7]) impossible for God to have wise and good reasons to create many particles of Matter exactly alike in different Parts of the Universe? In which case, the parts of Space being alike, 'tis evident there can be no reason, but mere Will, for not having originally transposed their Situations: And yet even This cannot be reasonably said to be a*4[8]) Will without Motive; for as much as the wise reasons God may possibly have to create many particles of Matter exactly alike, must consequently be a Motive to him to take (what a Balance could not do) one out of two absolutely Indifferents; that is, to place them in one Situation, when the transposing of them could not but have been exactly alike good.
Necessity, in Philosophical Questions, always signifies absolute Necessity. Hypothetical*1[9]) Necessity, and Moral Necessity, are only Figurative Ways of Speaking, and in Philosophical strictness of Truth, are no Necessity at all. The Question is not, whether a Thing must be, when it is supposed that it is, or that it is to be; (which is Hypothetical Necessity:) Neither is it the Question whether it be True that a good Being, continuing to be Good, cannot do Evil; or a wise Being, continuing to be Wise, cannot act unwisely; or a veracious Person, continuing to be veracious, cannot tell a Lie; (which is moral Necessity:) But the true and only Question in Philosophy concerning Liberty, is, whether the immediate Physical Cause or Principle of Action be indeed in Him whom we call the Agent; or whether it be some other Reason sufficient, which is the real Cause of the Action, by operating upon the Agent, and making him to be, not indeed an Agent, but a mere Patient.
It may here be observed, by the way; that this learned Author contradicts his own Hypothesis, when he says, that*2[10]) the Will does not always precisely follow the practical Understanding, because it may sometimes find Reasons to suspend its Resolution. For are not those very Reasons, the last Judgment of the practical Understanding?
21-25 If it is possible for God to make or to have made two Pieces of Matter exactly alike, so that the transposing them in Situation would be perfectly indifferent; this learned Author's Notion of a sufficient Reason, falls to the Ground. To this he answers; not, (as his Argument requires,) that 'tis*3[11]) impossible for God to make two Pieces exactly alike; but, that 'tis not Wise for him to do so. But how does he know, it would not be Wise for God to do so? Can he prove that it is not possible God may have Wise Reasons for creating Many Parts of Matter exactly alike in different Parts of the Universe? The only Argument
he alledges, is, that then there would not be a sufficient Reason to determine the Will of God, which Piece should be placed in which Situation. But if, for ought that any otherwise appears to the contrary, God may possibly have many wise Reasons for creating many Pieces exactly alike; will the Indifference alone of the Situation of such Pieces, make it impossible that he should create, or impossible that it should be Wise in him to create them? I humbly conceive, this is an*1[12]) express Begging of the Question. To the like Argument drawn by me from the absolute Indifferency of the original particular Determination of Motion, no Answer has been returned.
26-32. In these Articles, there seem to be contained many Contradictions. It is allowed*2[13]) that Two Things exactly alike, would really be Two; and yet it is still alledged, that they would want the Principle of Individuation; And in Paper 4th, §6, it was expresly affirmed, that they would be only the same Thing under two Names. A*3[14]) Supposition is allowed to be possible, and yet I must not be allowed to make the Supposition. The*4[15]) Parts of Time and Space are allowed to be exactly alike in Themselves, but not so when Bodies exist in them. Different co-existent Parts of Space, and different successive Parts of Time, are*5[16]) compared to a strait Line cutting another strait Line in two coincident Points, which are but one Point only. 'Tis affirmed, that*6[17]) Space is nothing but the Order of Things co-existing; and yet is*7[18]) confessed that the material Universe may possibly be Finite; in which Case there must necessarily be an empty extra-mundane Space. 'Tis*8[19]) allowed, that God could make the material Universe Finite: And yet the supposing it to be possibly Finite, is stiled not only a Supposition unreasonable and void of Design, but also an*9[20]) impracticable Fiction; and 'tis affirmed*10[21]), there can be no possible Reason which can limit the Quantity of Matter. 'Tis affirmed, that the Motion of the material Universe would produce*11[22]) no Change at all; and yet no Answer is given to the Argument I alledged, that a sudden Increase or Stoppage of the Motion of the Whole, would give a sensible Shock to all the Parts: And 'tis as evident, that a circular Motion of the Whole, would produce a vis centrifuga in all the Parts. My Argument, that the material World must be moveable, if the Whole be Finite; is*1[23]) denied, because the Parts of Space are immoveable, of which the Whole is Infinite and necessarily existing. It is affirmed, that Motion necessarily implies a*2[24]) Relative Change of Situation in one Body, with regard to other Bodies: And yet no way is shown to avoid this absurd Consequence, that then the Mobility of one Body depends on the Existence of other Bodies; and that any single Body existing Alone, would be incapable of Motion; or that the Parts of a circulating Body, (suppose the Sun) would lose the vis centrifuga arising from their circular Motion, if all the extrinsick Matter around them where annihilated. Lastly, 'tis affirmed that the*3[25]) Infinity of Matter is an Effect of the Will of God; And yet Cartesius's Notion is*4[26]) approved as irrefragable; the only Foundation of which, all Men know to have been this Supposition, that Matter was infinite necessarily in the Nature of Things, it being a Contradiction to suppose it Finite: His Words are*5[27]), Puto implicare contradictionem, ut Mundus sit finitus. Which if it be true, it never was in the Power of God to determine the Quantity of Matter; and consequently he neither was the Creator of it, nor can destroy it.
And indeed there seems to run a continual Inconsistency through the Whole of what this Learned Author writes concerning Matter and Space. For sometimes he argues against a Vacuum (or Space void of Matter) as if it was*6[28]) absolutely impossible in the Nature of Things; space and Matter being*7[29]) inseparable: And yet frequently he allows the Quantity of Matter in the Universe, to depend upon the*8[30]) Will of God.
33-35. To the Argument drawn against a Plenum of Matter, from the Want of Resistence in certain Spaces; this Learned Author answers, that those Spaces are filled with a Matter which has no*9[31]) Gravity. But the Argument was not drawn from Gravity, but from Resistence;
which must be proportionable to the Quantity of Matter, whether the Matter had any Gravity, or no.
To obviate this Reply, he alleges that*1[32]) Resistence does not arise so much from the Quantity of Matter, as from its Difficulty of giving Place. But this Allegation is wholly wide of the Purpose; because the Question related only to such Fluid Bodies which have little or no Tenacity, as Water and Quicksilver, whose Parts have no other Difficulty of giving Place, but what arises from the Quantity of the Matter they contain. The Instance of a*2[33]) floating Piece of Wood, containing less of heavy Matter than an equal Bulk of Water, and yet making greater Resistence; is wonderfully unphilosophical: For an equal Bulk of Water shut up in a Vessel, or frozen into Ice, and floating, makes a greater Resistence than the floating Wood; the Resistence Then arising from the whole Bulk of the Water: But when the Water is loose and at liberty in its State of Fluidity, the Resistence Then is made not by the whole, but by part only, of the equal Bulk of Water; and then it is no wonder that it seems to make less Resistence than the Wood.
36-48. These Paragraphs do not seem to contain serious Arguments, but only represent in an ill Light the Notion of the Immensity or Omnipresence of God; who is not a mere Intelligentia supramundana, [Semota a nostris rebus sejunctaque longe] is not far from every one of us*3[34]); for in him we (and all Things) live and move and have our Being.
The Space occupied by a Body, is not the*4[35]) Extension of the Body; but the extended Body exists in that Space.
There is no such Thing in reality, as*5[36]) bounded Space; but only we in our Imagination fix our Attention upon what Part or Quantity we please, of that which it self is always and necessarily unbounded.
Space is not an*6[37]) Affection of one Body, or of another Body, or of any finite Being; nor passes from Subject to Subject; but is always invariably the Immensity of one only and always the same Immensum.
Finite Spaces are not at all the*7[38]) Affections of Finite Substances;
but they are only those Parts of Infinite Space, in which Finite Substances exist.
If Matter was infinite, yet infinite Space would no more be an*1[39]) Affection of that infinite Body, than finite Spaces are the Affections of finite Bodies; but, in that Case, the infinite Matter would be, as finite Bodies now are, in the infinite Space.
Immensity, as well as Eternity, is*2[40]) essential to God. The*3[41]) Parts of Immensity, (being totally of a different kind from corporeal, partable, separable, divisible, moveable Parts, which are the ground of Corruptibility) do no more hinder Immensity from being essentially One, than the Parts of Duration hinder Eternity from being essentially One.
God himself suffers*4[42]) no Change at all, by the Variety and Changeableness of Things which live and move and have their Being in him.
This*5[43]) strange Doctrine, is the express Assertion of*6[44]) St. Paul, as well as the plain Voice of Nature and Reason.
God does not*7[45]) exist In Space, and In Time; but His Existence causes Space and Time. And when, according to the Analogy of vulgar Speech, we say that he exists in All Space and in All Time; the Words mean only that he is Omnipresent and Eternal, that is, that Boundless Space and Time are necessary Consequences of his Existence; and not, that Space and Time are Beings distinct from him, and IN which he exists.
How*8[46]) Finite Space is not the extension of Bodies, I have shown just above, on §40. And the two following Paragraphs also (§47 and 48) need only to be compared with what hath been already*9[47]) said.
49-54. These seem to me, to be only a quibbling upon Words. Concerning the Question about Space having Parts, see above Reply 3, §3 and Reply 4, §11.
52 and 53. My Argument here, for the Notion of Space being really independent upon Body, is founded on the Possibility of the material Universe being finite and moveable: 'Tis not enough therefore for this Learned Writer to reply, that he thinks it would not have been wise and reasonable for God to have made the material Universe finite and moveable. He must either affirm, that 'twas impossible for God to make the material World finite and moveable; or else he must of necessity allow the Strength of my Argument, drawn from the Possibility of the World's being finite and moveable. Neither is it sufficient barely to repeat his Assertion, that the Motion of a finite material Universe would be nothing, and (for want of other Bodies to compare it with) would*1[48]) produce no discoverable Change: Unless he could disprove the Instance which I gave of a very great Change that would happen; viz. that the Parts would be sensibly shocked by a sudden Acceleration, or stopping of the Motion of the Whole: To which Instance, he has not attempted to give any Answer.
Whether this learned Author's being forced here to acknowledge the difference between absolute real Motion and relative Motion, does not necessarily infer that Space is really a quite different Thing from the Situation or Order of Bodies; I leave to the Judgment of those who shall be pleased to compare what this learned Writer here alleges, with what Sir Isaac Newton has said in his Principia Lib. 1 Defin. 8.
I had alleged that Time and Space were QUANTITIES, which Situation and Order were not. To this, it is replied; that Order has its Quantity; there is that which goes before, and that which follows; there is Distance or Interval. I answer: Going before, and following, constitutes Situation or Order: But the Distance, Interval, or Quantity of Time or Space, wherein one Thing follows another, is entirely a distinct Thing from the Situation or Order, and does not constitute any Quantity of Situation or Order: The Situation or Order may be the same, when the Quantity of Time or Space intervening is very different. This Learned Author further replies, that Ratio's or Proportions*2[49]) have their Quantity; and therefore so may Time an Space, though they be nothing but Relations. I answer 1st; If id had been true, that some particular Sorts of Relations, such as Ratio's or Proportions, were Quantities; yet it would not have followed, that Situation and Order, which are Relations of a quite different Kind, would have been Quantities too. But 2dly; Proportions are not Quantities, but the Proportions of Quantities. If they vere Quantities, they would be the Quantities of Quantities; which is absurd. Also, if they were Quantities, they would (like all other Quantities) increase always by Addition: But the Addition of the Proportion of 1 to 1, to the Proportion of 1 to 1, makes still no more than the Proportion of 1 to 1; and the Addition of the Proportion of half to 1, to the Proportion of 1 to 1, does not make the Proportion of 1 and a half to 1, but the Proportion only of half to 1. That which Mathematicians sometimes inaccurately call the Quantity of Proportion, is (accurately and strictly speaking) only the Quantity of the Relative or Comparative Magnitude of one Thing with regard to another: And Proportion is not the comparative Magnitude it self, but the Comparison or Relation of the Magnitude to Another. The Proportion of 6 to 1, with regard to that of 3 to 1, is not a double Quantity of Proportion, but the Proportion of a double Quantity. And in general, what they call Bearing a greater or less Proportion, is not bearing a greater or less Quantity of Proportion or Relation, but, bearing the Proportion or Relation of a greater or less Quantity to Another: 'Tis not a greater or less Quantity of Comparison, but the Comparison of a greater or less Quantity. The*1[50]) Logarithmick Expression of a Proportion, is not (as this learned Author stiles it) a Measure, but only an artificial Index or Sign of Proportion: 'Tis not the expressing a Quantity of Proportion, but barely a denoting the Number of Times that any Proportion is repeated or complicated. The Logarithm of the Proportion of Equality, is 0; and yet 'tis as real and as much a Proportion, as any other: And when the Logarithm is negative, as ¯1; yet the Proportion, of which it is the Sign or Index, is it self affirmative. Duplicate or Triplicate Proportion, does not denote a double or triple Quantity of Proportion, but the Number of Times that the Proportion is repeated. The tripling of any Magnitude or Quantity once, produces a Magnitude or Quantity, which to the former bears the Proportion of 3 to 1. The tripling it a second time, produces (not a double Quantity of Proportion, but) a Magnitude or Quantity, which to the former bears the Proportion (called triplicate) of 27 to 1: And so an. 3dly, Time and Space are not of the Nature of Proportions at all, but of the Nature of absolute Quantities to which Proportions belong. As for Example: The Proportion of 12 to 1, is a much greater Proportion (that is, as I now observed, not a greater Quantity of Proportion, but the Proportion of a greater comparative Quantity,) than that of 2 to 1; and yet one and the same unvaried Quantity, may to one Thing bear the Proportion of 12 to 1, and to another Thing at the same time the Proportion of 2 to 1. Thus the Space of a Day, bears a much greater Proportion to an Hour, than it does to half a Day; and yet it remains, notwith standing Both the Proportions, the same unvaried Quantity of Time. Time therefore [and Space likewise by the same Argument] is not of the Nature of a Proportion, but of an absolute and unvaried Quantity, to which different Proportions belong. Unless this Reasoning can be shown to be false, our Learned Author's Opinion still remains, by his*1[51]) own Confession, a Contradiction.
55-63 All This, seems to me to be a plain Contradiction; and I am willing to leave it to the Judgement of the Learned. In*2[52]) one Paragraph, there is a plain and distinct Supposition, that the Universe might be created as much sooner or later as God pleased. In the*3[53]) rest, the very Terms [sooner or later] are treated as unintelligible Terms and*4[54]) impossible Suppositions. And the like, concerning the Space in which Matter subsists, See above, on § 26-32.
64. and 65 See above upon §54.
66-70. See above, on § 1-20, and on § 21-25. I shall here only add, that*5[55]) comparing the Will of God, when it chooses one out of many equally good ways of acting, to Epicurus's Chance, who allowed No Will, No Intelligence, No Active Principle at all in the formation of the Universe; is comparing together Two things, than which No Two things can possibly be more different.
See above, on § 21-25.
See above, on § 1-20.
73-75 In the consideration whether Space be independent upon Matter, and whether the material Universe Can be Finite and Moveable (See above, on § 1-20 and on 26-32) the question is not concerning the Wisdom or*1[56]) Will of God, but concerning the absolute and necessary Nature of Things. If the Material Universe CAN possibly, by the Will of God, be Finite and Moveable (which this learned Author here finds himself necessitated to grant, though he perpetually treats it as an impossible supposition:) then Space (in which That Motion is performed) is manifestly independent upon Matter. But if, on the contrary, the material Universe*2[57]) Cannot be finite and moveable, and Space cannot be independent upon Matter; then (I say) it follows evidently, that God neither Can nor ever Could set Bounds to Matter; and consequently the material Universe must be not only boundless, but*3[58]) eternal also, both a parte ante and a parte post, necessarily and independently on the Will of God. For, the Opinion of those who contend, that the World*4[59]) might possibly be Eternal, by the Will of God exercising his Eternal Power; this has no Relation at all, to the Matter at present in Question.
76 and 77. See above, on § 73-75 and on § 1-20. And below, on §103.
This Paragraph contains no new Objection. The Aptness and Intelligibleness of the Similitude made use of by Sir Isaac Newton, and here excepted against, has been abundantly explained in the foregoing Papers.
79-82. All that is objected in the*5[60]) two former of these Paragraphs, is a mere quibbling upon Words. The Existence of God (as has often been already observed) causes Space; and In that Space, All other Things exist. It is therefore*6[61]) the Place of Ideas likewise; because it is the Place of the Substances themselves, in whose Understandings Ideas exist.
The Soul of Man being*7[62]) the Soul of the Images of the Things which it perceives, was alledged by me, in way of comparison, as an Instance of a ridicolous Notion: And this learned Writer pleasantly argues against it, as if I had affirmed it to be my own Opinion.
God perceives every Thing, not*1[63]) by means of any Organ, but by being himself actually present every where. This every where therefore, or universal Space, is the Place of his Perception. The Notion of Sensorium, and of the Soul of the World, has been abundantly explained before. 'Tis too much to desire to have the Conclusion given up, without bringing any further Objection against the Premises.
83-88 and 89-91. That*2[64]) the Soul is a Representative Principle: That*3[65]) every simple Substance is by its Nature a Concentration and living Mirror of the whole Universe; That*4[66]) it is a representation of the Universe, according to its Point of View; and that all simple Substances will always have a Harmony between themselves, because they always represent the same Universe: All This, I acknowledge, I unterstand not at all.
Concerning the*5[67]) Harmonia praestabilita, by which the Affections of the Soul, and the Mechanic Motions of the Body, are affirmed to agree, without at all influencing each other; See below, on § 110-116.
That the Images of Things are conveyed by the Organs of Sense into the Sensory, where the Soul perceives them; is affirmed but not proved, to be an*6[68]) unintelligible Notion.
Concerning*7[69]) immaterial Substance affecting, or being affected by, material Substance; See below, on § 110-116.
That God*8[70]) perceives and knows all Things, not by being Present to them, but by continually producing them anew; is a mere Fiction of the Schoolmen, without any Proof.
The Objection concerning God's being*9[71]) of the Soul of the World, has been abundantly answered above, Reply II §12 and Reply IV §32.
To suppose, that all the Motions of our Bodies are necessary, and caused entirely*10[72]) by mere mechanical Impulses of Matter, altogether independent on the Soul; is what (I cannot but think) tends to introduce Necessity and Fate. It tends to make Men be thought as mere Machines, as Des Cartes imagined Beasts to be; by taking away all Arguments drawn from Phaenomena, that is, from the Actions of Men, to prove that there is any Soul, or any thing more than mere Matter in Men at all. See below, on § 110-116.
93-95. I alledged, that every Action is the giving of a New Force to the Thing acted upon. To this it is objected, that two equal hard Bodies stricking each other, return with the same Force; and that therefore their Action upon each other, gives no New Force. It might be sufficient to reply, that the Bodies do Neither of them return with their own Force, but each of them*1[73]) loses its own Force, and each returns with a new Force impressed by the others Elasticity: For if they are not elastical, they return not at all. But indeed, all mere mechanical Communications of Motion, are not properly Action, but mere Passiveness, both in the Bodies that impell, and that are impelled. Action, is the beginning of a Motion where there was none before, from a Principle of Life or Activity: And if God or Man, or Any Living or Active Power, ever influences any thing in the material World; and every thing be not mere absolute Mechanism; there must be a continual Increase and Decrease of the whole Quantity of Motion in the Universe. Which this learned Gentleman frequently denies.
96 and 97. Here this learned Author refers only to what he has said elsewhere: And I also am willing to do the same.
If the Soul be a Substance which fills the Sensorium, or Place wherein it perceives the Images of Things conveyed to it; yet is does not thence follow, that it must consist of corporeal Parts (for the Parts of Body are distinct Substances independent on each other) the Whole Soul sees, and the Whole hears, and the Whole thinks, as being essentially one Individual.
In order to show that the Active Forces in the World (meaning the Quantity of Motion or Impulsive Force given to Bodies) do not naturally diminish; this Learned Writer urges, that two soft unelastick Bodies meeting together with equal and contrary Forces, do for this only Reason lose each of them the Motion of their Whole, because it is communicated and dispersed into a Motion of their small Parts. But the Question is; when two perfectly HARD un-elastick Bodies lose their whole Motion by meeting together, what then becomes of the Motion or active impulsive Force? It cannot be dispersed among the Parts, because the parts are capable of no tremulous Motion for want of elasticity. And if it be denied, that the Bodies would lose the Motion of their Wholes; I answer: Then it would follow, that Elastick Hard Bodies would reflect with a double Force; viz. the force arising from the elasticity, and moreover all (or at least part of) the original direct force: Which is contrary to experience.
At length (upon the Demonstration I cited from Sir Isaac Newton) he is obliged toy*1[74]) allow, that the Quantity of Motion in the World, is not always the same; And goes to another refuge, that Motion and Force are not always the same in Quantity. But this also is contrary to experience. For the Force here spoken of, is not the Vis inertiae of Matter (which continues indeed always the same, so lang as the Quantity of Matter continues the same) but the Force here meant, is relative Active impulsive Force; which is always proportional to the Quantity of Relative Motion: As is constantly evident in Experience; except where some Error has been committed, in not rightly computing and subducting the contrary or impeding Force, which arises from the Resistence of Fluids to Bodies moved any way, and from the continual contrary Action of Gravitation upon Bodies thrown upwards.
100-102. That Active Force, in the Sense above defined, does naturally diminish continually in the material Universe; hath been shown in the last Paragraph. That this is no Defect, is evident; because 'tis only a Consequence of Matter being lifeless, void of Motivity, unactive and inert. For the Inertia of Matter, causeth, not only (as this learned Author observes) that Velocity decreases in proportion as Quantity of Matter increases (which is indeed no decrease of the Quantity of Motion;) but also that solid and perfectly hard Bodies, void of Elasticity, meeting together with equal and contrary Forces, lose their whole Motion and Active Force, (as has been above shown) and must depend upon some other Cause for new Motion.
That none of the things here referred to, are Defects; I have largely shown in my former Papers. For why was not God at Liberty to make a World, that should continue in its present Form as long or as short a time as he thought fit, and should then be altered (by such Changes as may be very wise and Fit, and yet Impossible perhaps to be performed by Mechanism), into whatever other Form he himself pleased? Whether my Inference from this Learned Author's affirming*1[75]) that the Universe cannot diminish in Perfection, that there is no possible Reason which can limit the Quantity of Matter, that*2[76]) God's Perfections oblige him to produce always as much Matter as he can, and that a Finite Material Universe is an Impracticable Fiction; whether (I say) my Inferring, that (according to these Notions) the World must needs have been both Infinite and Eternal, be a just Inference or no, I am willing to leave to the Learned, who shall compare the Papers, to judge.
104-106. We are Now told, that*3[77]) Space is not an Order or Situation, but an Order of Situations. But still the Objection remains; that an Order of Situations is not Quantity, as Space is. He refers therefore to §54, where he thinks he has proved that Order is a Quantity: And I refer to what I have said above in this Paper, upon that Section; where I think I have proved, that it is not a Quantity. What he alledges concerning*4[78]) Time likewise, amounts plainly to the following Absurdity: that Time is only the Order of Things successive, and yet is truly a Quantity; because it is, not only the Order of Things successive, but also the Quantity of Duration intervening between each of the Particulars succeeding in That Order. Which is an express Contradiction.
To say that*5[79]) Immensity does not signify Boundless Space, and that Eternity does not signify Duration or Time without Beginning and End, is (I think) affirming that Words have no meaning. Instead of reasoning upon this Point, we are referred to what certain Divines and Philosophers (that is, such as were of this Learned Author's Opinion) have acknowledged: Which is not the Matter in Question.
107-109. I affirmed, that, with regard to God, no one Possible thing is more miraculous than other; and that therefore a Miracle does not consist in any Difficulty in the Nature of the Thing to be done, but merely in the Unusualness of God's doing it. The Terms, Nature, and Powers of Nature, and Course of Nature, and the like, are nothing but empty Words; and signify merely, that a thing usually or frequently comes to pass. The Raising a Human Body out of the Dust of the Earth, we call a Miracle; the Generation of a Human Body in the ordinary way, we call Natural; for no other Reason, but because the Power of God effects one usually, the other unusually. The sudden stopping of the Sun (or Earth) we call a Miracle; the continual Motion of the Sun (or Earth) we call Natural; for the very same Reason only, of the one's being usual, the other unusual. Did Men usually arise out of the Grave, as Corn grows out of Seed sown, we should certainly call That also natural: And did the Sun (or Earth) constantly stand still, we should then think That to be natural, and its Motion at any time would be miraculous. Against the evident Reasons [ces*1[80]) grandes Raisons] this learned Writer offers nothing at all; but continues barely to refer us to the Vulgar Forms of Speaking of certain Philosophers and Divines: Which (as I before observed) is not the Matter in Question.
110-116. It is here very surprizing, that, in a Point of Reason and not of Authority, we are still again*2[81]) remitted to the Opinions of certain Philosophers and Divines. But, to omit This: What does this Learned Writer mean by a*3[82]) real Internal Difference between what is miraculous, and not miraculous; or between*4[83]) Operations natural, and not natural; absolutely, and with regard to God? Does he think there are in God two different and really distinct Principles or Powers of Acting, and that one thing is more difficult to God than another? If not: then either a natural and supernatural Action of God, are Terms whose Signification is only relative to Us; we calling an usual Effect of God's Power, natural; and an unusal one, supernatural; they*5[84]) force of Nature being, in truth, nothing but an empty word: Or else, by the One must be meant That which God does immediately Himself; and by the Other, that which he does mediately by the instrumentality of second Causes. The former of these Distinctions, is what this Learned Author is here professedly opposing: The latter is what he expresly disclaims, §117, where he allows that Angels may work True Miracles. And yet besides these Two, I think no other Distinction can possibly be imagined.
It is very unreasonable to call*1[85]) Attraction a Miracle, and an unphilosophical Term; after it has been so often distinctly declared, that by That Term we do not mean to express the Cause of Bodies tending towards each other, but barely the Effect, or the Phaenomenon it self, and the Laws or Proportions of that Tendency discovered by Experience; whatever be or be not the Cause of it. And it seems still more unreasonable, not to admit Gravitation or Attraction in This sense, in which it is manifestly an actual Phaenomenon of nature; and yet at the same time to expect that there should be admitted so strange an Hypothesis, as the*2[86]) harmonia praestabilita; which is, that the Soul and Body of a Man have no more Influence upon each others Motions and Affections, than two Clocks, which, at the greatest distance from each other, go alike, without at all affecting each other. It is alleged indeed, that God*3[87]), foreseeing the Inclinations of every Man's Soul, so contrived at first the great Machine of the material Universe, as that, by the mere necessary Laws of Mechanism, suitable Motions should be excited in Human Bodies, as Parts of that great Machine. But is it possible, that such Kinds of Motion, and of such variety, as those in Human Bodies are; should be performed by mere Mechanism, without any Influence of Will and Mind upon them? Or is it credible, that when a Man has it in his Power to resolve and know a Month before-hand, what he will do upon such a particular Day or Hour to come; is it credible, I say, that his Body shall by the mere Power of Mechanism, impressed originally upon the material Universe at its Creation, punctually conform it self to the Resolutions of the Man's Mind at the Time appointed? According to This Hypothesis, All Arguments in Philosophy, taken from Phaenomena and Experiments, are at an end. For, if the Harmonia praestabilita be true, a Man does not indeed see, nor hear, nor feel any thing, nor moves his Body; but only dreams that he sees, and hears, and feels, and moves his Body. And if the World can once be perswaded, that a Man's Body is a mere Machine; and that all his seemingly voluntary Motions are performed by the mere necessary Laws of corporal Mechanism, without any Influence, or Operation, or Action at all of the Soul upon the Body; they will soon conclude, that this Machine is the whole Man; and that the harmonical Soul, in the Hypothesis of an harmonia praestabilita, is merely a Fiction and a Dream. Besides: What Difficulty is there avoided, by so strange an Hypothesis? This only; that it cannot be conceived (it seems) how immaterial Substance should act upon Matter. But is not God an immaterial Substance? And does not He act upon Matter? And what greater Difficulty is there in conceiving how an immaterial Substance should act upon Matter, than in conceiving how Matter acts upon Matter? Is it not as easy to conceive, how certain Parts of Matter may be obliged to follow the Motions and Affections of the Soul, without corporeal Contact; as that certain Portions of Matter should be obliged to follow each others Motions by the adhaesion of Parts, which no Mechanism can account for? or that Rays of Light should reflect regularly from a Surface which they never touch? Of which, Sir Isaac Newton in his Opticks has given us several evident and ocular Experiments.
Nor is it less surprizing, to find this Assertion again repeated in express Words, that, after the first Creation of Things*1[88]), the continuation of the Motions of the heavenly Bodies, and the Formation of Plants and Animals, and every Motion of the Bodies both of Men and all other Animals, is as mechanical as the Motions of a Clock. Whoever entertains this Opinion, is (I think) obliged in reason to be able to explain particularly, by what Laws of Mechanism the Planets and Comets can continue to move in the Orbs they do, thro' unresisting Spaces; and by what mechanical Laws, both Plants and Animals are formed; and how the infinitely various spontaneous Motions of Animals and Men, are performed. Which, I am fully persuaded, is as impossible to make out, as it would be to show how a House or City could be built, or the World it self have been at first formed by mere Mechanism, without any Intelligent and Active Cause. That Things could not be at first produced by Mechanism, is expresly allowed: And, when this is once granted; why, after That, so great Concern should be shown, to exclude God's actual Government of the World, and to allow his Providence to act no further than barely in concurning (as the Phrase is) to let all Things do only what they would do of themselves by mere Mechanism; and why it should be thought that God is under any Obligation or Confinement either in Nature or Wisdom, never to bring about any thing in the Universe, but what is possible for a corporeal Machine to accomplish by mere mechanick Laws, after it is once set a going; I can no way conceive.
This learned Author's allowing in this Place, that there is greater and less in true Miracles, and that Angels are capable of working some true Miracles; is perfectly*1[89]) contradictory to that Notion of the Nature of a Miracle, which he has all along pleaded for in these Papers.
118-123. That the Sun attracts the Earth, through the intermediate void Space; that is, that is, that the Earth and Sun gravitate towards each other, or tend (whatever be the Cause of that Tendency) towards each other, with a Force which is in a direct proportion of their Masses, or Magnitudes and Densities together, and in an inverse duplicate proportion of their Distances; and that the Space betwixt them is void, that is, hath nothing in it which sensibly resists the Motion of Bodies passing transversly through: All This, is nothing but a Phaenomenon, or actual Matter of Fact, found by Experience. That this Phaenomenon is not produced*2[90]). sans moyen, that is, without some Cause capable of producing such an Effect; is undoubtedly true. Philosophers therefore may search after and discover That Cause, if they can; be it mechanical, or not mechanical. But if they cannot discover the Cause; is therefore the Effect it self, the Phaenomenon, or the Matter of Fact discovered by Experience (which is all that is meant by the Words Attraction and Gravitation) ever the less True? Or is a manifest Quality to be called*3[91]) occult, because the immediate efficient Cause of it (perhaps) is occult, nor not yet discovered? When a Body*4[92]) moves in a Circle, without flying off in the Tangent; 'tis certain there is something that hinders it: But if in some Cases it be not mechanically*5[93]) explicable, or be not yet discovered, what that something is; does it therefore follow, that the Phaenomenon it self is false? This is very singular Argument indeed.
124-130. The Phaenomenon it self, the Attraction, Gravitation, or Tendency of Bodies towards each other (or whatever other Name you please to call it by) and the Laws, or Proportions, of that Tendency, are now sufficiently known by Observations and Experiments. If This or any other learned Author can by*1[94]) the Laws of Mechanism explain these Phaenomena, he will not only not ben contradicted, but will moreover have the abundant Thanks of the Learned World. But, in the mean time, to*2[95]) compare Gravitation (which is a Phaenomenon or actual Matter of Fact) with Epicurus' Declination of Atoms (which, according to his corrupt and Atheistical Perversion of some more antient and perhaps better Philosophy, was an Hypothesis or Fiction only, and an impossible one too, in a World where no Intelligence was supposed to be present) seems to be a very extraordinary Method of reasoning.
As to the grand Principle of a*3[96]) sufficient Reason; all that this Learned Writer here adds concerning it, is only by way of Affirming, not proving, his Conclusion; and therefore needs no Answer. I shall only observe, that the Phrase is of an equivocal Signification; and may either be so understood, as to mean Necessity only, or so as to include likewise Will and Choice. That in general there*4[97]) is a sufficient Reason why every Thing is, which Is; is undoubtedly true, and agreed on all Hands. But the Question is, whether, in some Cases, when it may be highly reasonable to act, yet different possible Ways of acting may not possibly be equally reasonable; and whether, in such Cases, they*5[98]) bare Will of God be not it self a sufficient Reason for acting in this or the other particular manner; and whether in Cases where there are the strongest possible Reasons altogether on One Side, yet in all Intelligent and Free Agents, the Principle of Action (in which I think the Essence of Liberty consists) be not a distinct Thing from the Motive or Reason which the Agent has in his View. All these are constantly denied by this Learned Writer. And his*6[99]) laying down his grand Principle of a sufficient Reason in such a Sense as to exclude all these; and expecting it should be granted him in that Sense, without Proof; This is what I call his Petitio Principii, or Begging of the Question: Than which, nothing can be more unphilosophical.
1[2]) §3.
2[3]) §14.
3[4]) §15.
1[5]) §16, 17, 18, 19 and 69.
2[6]) §20.
3[7]) §16, 17, 69 and 66.
4[8]) §16 and 69.
1[9]) §4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.
2[10]) §11.
3[11]) See Mr. Leibnitz's Fourth Paper, §2, 3, 6, 13 and 15.
1[12]) §20.
2[13]) §26.
3[14]) §26.
4[15]) §27.
5[16]) §28.
6[17]) §29.
7[18]) §30.
8[19]) §30 and 8 and 73.
9[20]) §29.
10[21]) Fourth Paper, §21.
11[22]) §29.
1[23]) §31.
2[24]) §31.
3[25]) §32.
4[26]) Ibid.
5[27]) Epist. 69 Partis primae.
6[28]) §29, 33, 34, 35, 62, 63.
7[29]) §62.
8[30]) §30, 32 and 73.
9[31]) §35.
1[32]) §34.
2[33]) Ibid.
3[34]) Acts. XVII. 27, 28.
4[35]) §36, 37.
5[36]) §38.
6[37]) §39.
7[38]) §40.
1[39]) §41.
2[40]) §42.
3[41]) See above in my Third Reply §3, and Fourth Reply §11.
4[42]) §43.
5[43]) §44.
6[44]) Acts XVII. 27, 28.
7[45]) §45.
8[46]) §46.
9[47]) See also below on §53 and on §54.
1[48]) §52.
2[49]) §54.
1[50]) §54.
1[51]) Fourth Paper §16.
2[52]) §56.
3[53]) §55, 57, 58-63.
4[54]) Fourth Paper §15.
5[55]) §70.
1[56]) §73.
2[57]) Fourth Paper §21 and Fifth Paper §29.
3[58]) §74.
4[59]) §75.
5[60]) §79, 80.
6[61]) §80.
7[62]) §81.
1[63]) §82.
2[64]) §83.
3[65]) §87.
4[66]) §91.
5[67]) §83, 87, 89, 90.
6[68]) §84.
7[69]) §84.
8[70]) §85.
9[71]) §86, 87, 88, 82.
10[72]) §92, 95 and 116.
1[73]) See more, on §99.
1[74]) §99.
1[75]) Fourth Paper §40, 20, 21, 22, and Fifth Paper §29.
2[76]) See above, Mr. Leibnitz's Postscript to his Fourth Paper.
3[77]) §104.
4[78]) §105.
5[79]) §106.
1[80]) §108.
2[81]) §110.
3[82]) §110.
4[83]) §111.
5[84]) §112.
1[85]) §113.
2[86]) §109 and 92, and 87, 89, 90.
3[87]) §92.
1[88]) §115, 116.
1[89]) See above, Mr. Leibnitz's Third Paper §17.
2[90]) §118.
3[91]) §122.
4[92]) §123.
5[93]) §123.
1[94]) §124.
2[95]) §128.
3[96]) §125 etc.
4[97]) §125.
5[98]) See above, on § 1-20 and 21-25.
6[99]) §20 and 125. etc.
Alberti an Leibniz.
Vous m'obligeriez, Monsieur, sensiblement de vouloir bien me dire en peu de mots les raisons que vous avez de ne pas croire que l'essence du corps soit la longueur, la largeur et la profondeur, comme je vois que beaucoup du monde est prevenu de cette idée; je serois bien aise scavoir precisément à quoy je m'en dois tenir.
Si l’essence du corps consistoit dans l’étendue, la seule étendue suffiroit pour rendre raison de toutes les affections du corps. Or je ne voy pas comment on puisse deduire les loix du mouvement qui sont fondées sur la conservation de la même quantité de force, sans que la même quantité de mouvement se puisse tousjours conserver.
La force est quelque chose de different de l’étendue; aussi c’est de la force et non pas de l’étendue que l’action et passion peut naistre.
La nature du lieu ou de l’espace consiste dans l’étendue, mais celle du corps demande une resistence ou reaction, qui enferme une action et une passion, Ântitypían. Je confesse que tout est plein, mais il ne faut pas confondre pour cela les notions du lieu et du corps.
Tout corps estant actuellement divisé en parties infinies, s’il n’y avoit que de l’étendue dans les corps, il n’y auroit point de substance corporelle, ny rien dont on puisse dire, voicy veritablement une substance. Car toute masse corporelle est un aggregat d’autres masses, et cellescy encor d’autres, et ainsi à l’infini. Ainsi les corps se reduiroient à des pures apparences, s’il n’y avoit en eux que de l’étendue ou de la multitude, et rien où il se trouvât le principe d’une veritable unité. C’est ce qui a forcé Mons. Cordemoy à retourner aux atomes qui ne sçauroient pourtant avoir lieu sans miracle. Et de telles considerations ont forcé M. Nicole de dire en quelque endroit de ses Essais, que ceux qui considerent bien les difficultés de ces choses en sont effrayés. Et qu’il croit qu’il y a plus de prevention que de lumiere dans ceux qui n’y trouvent point de peine.
Generalement la nature de la substance est d’estre feconde, et de faire naistre des suites ou varietés, au lieu que l’étendue ne donne que des possibilités sans enfermer quelque activité. Quand on oste l’action aux creatures, on favorise sans y penser les sentimens de Spinosa, qui veut qu’il n’y a qu’une seule substance qu’il appelle Dieu et dont il croit que les autres choses ne sont que des modes.
J’ay prouvé dans mes Dynamiques que les forces absolues d’un corps sont comme les quarrés de ses vitesses, qu’il y a un centre de gravité dans toute sorte de corps, ce que les Mathematiciens ont supposé jusqu’icy sans le prouver, quoyque la chose ne soit manifeste assez, que la force respective avec laquelle des corps agissent l’un sur l’autre, et leur force commune directive prises ensemble font la force totale absolue, et que ces trois forces conservent tousjours la même quantité. Mais que la même quantité de mouvement ne se conserve point. Je demonstre aussi que plusieurs directions composées ensemble tendent au centre commun de gravité de tous les points extremes de chaque tendence. Item que la force vive est à la force que j’appelle morte, comme l’infini au fini. Et j’ay joint enfin un essai, pour rendre des raisons physiques des mouvemens celestes.
Je me suis assés arresté à Florence, où j’ay trouvé les deux princes extremement curieux et amateurs des belles connoissances. Outre quantité de personnes doctes et des belles bibliotheques, où il y a des Ms. de consequence, j’ay vû la lettre de S. Chrysostome ad Caesarium qui a fait tant de bruit, mais il me semble qu’elle n’est pas irreconciliable avec la presence reelle. J’y ay vû aussi un livre imprimé vers la fin du 15 siecle que j’avois desiré de voir il y a longtemps, sçavoir Johannis Suisset Calculationes de Motu et intensionibus et remissionibus formarum seu quantitatum. Il estoit fameux sous le nom de Calculator. Et Scaliger adversus Cardanum en fait mention avec eloge. C’estoit quelque chose de singulier qu’un scholastique raisonnât Mathematiquement.
Il y a deja 3 semaines que je me trouve à Modene, où S. A. S. m’a fait fournir des ecritures de son Archif et autres Ms. par lesquels je suis eclairci sur les doutes que j’avois aussi bien que feu Mons. du Cange et Mons. Justel (qui en ont conferé avec moy) sur la verité de l’origine commune des deux .....1 maisons de Bronsvic et d’Este. Car Faleti, Pigna et autres Historiens de la maison d’Este ont tellement brouillé les choses et melé tant de faussetés dans leur histoire qu’il n’y a point d’apparence de les croire sur leur parole. J’ay appris à Bologne qu’il y a le pere Bassano Dominiquani qui a eu la curiosité d’amasser quantité de livres Antijesuitiques.
J’espere que M. Arnaud se portera encor bien. Quand j’estois en Allemagne, j’avois echangé avec luy quelques lettres sur mes pensées Metaphysiques; la derniere est demeurée sans replique, parceque M. Arnaud estant alors fort occupé et la matiere demandant une grande attention, il répondit qu’il l’examineroit à son premier loisir. Mais il est trop distrait, et son temps est si pretieux, que je n’ose pas luy demander la continuation de ses reflexions, que j’estime extremement, parce qu’il approfondit les choses et a même un don rare aux grands hommes qui est de se rendre quelquesfois apres une meure discussion.
Je vous dois encor reponse à deux de vos lettres dont la derniere avoit esté écrite à l’occasion de Mons. le Baron Bodeni.1 Elles me sont tousjours agreables, que sans quantité de distractions j’écrirois plus souvent, dans l’esperance d’en recevoir beaucoup. Cependant je seray bien content, si j’en reçois de temps en temps. J’ay repondu à Mons. le Baron Bodeni par la droiture. Celuy dont je souhaiterois de sçavoir des nouvelles, s’appelloit Mons. des Billets, si je ne me trompe, car je ne sçay si j’ay bien compris l’orthographie d’un nom, que j’ay seulement entendu. Lorsque M. Arnaud demeuroit au fauxbourg S. Jaques, il estoit dans la même maison aussi bien que feu Mons. l’Abbé Galinée, et ces deux Messieurs s’appliquoient fort aux Mecaniques, et avoient mille modelles, instrumens, et inventions jolies. Mais Mons. des Billets (ou des Billettes) estoit intime de M. Arnaud; son frere estoit gentilhomme de M. le Duc de Roannez, et paroissoit avoir beaucoup de credit aupres de lui. Je serois bien aise d’apprendre si ce Mons. des Billets vit encor.
Il me semble que je suis maintenant à Rome, et que je vous entends juger solidement à vostre ordinaire des affaires courantes et particulierement
du Conclave, et cette imagination me donne du plaisir. Si j’estois des Electeurs, je donnerois ma voix à Barbarigo ou Coloredo ou Casanata, ou bien à Laurea ou Capezucchi, car ce sont de gens connus au moins dans la Republique des lettres, et de plus capables du gouvernement. Je ne doute point de la capacité de Chigi ou d’Altieri ou de Cibo, mais je doute qu’on les veuille faire papes deux fois. On dit du bien de Conti, Panciatici, et de quelques autres, dont je souhaitte de sçavoir vostre jugement, tant à l’egard de ceux qu’on a lieu de souhaitter que de ceux qu’on a droit d’attendre.
Vous me demandés, Monsieur, les raisons que j’ay de ne pas admettre que l’idée du corps ou de la matiere n’est autre que celle de l’etendue. Il est vray, comme vous dites, que bien d’habiles gens sont prevenus aujourdhuy de ce sentiment, que l’essence du corps consiste dans la longueur, largeur et profondeur. Cependant il y en a encor qu’on ne peut pas accuser de trop d’attachement à la scholastique, qui n’en sont pas contents. Mons. Nicole dans un endroit de ses essais témoigne d’estre de ce nombre, et il luy semble, qu’il y a plus de prevention que de lumiere dans ceux qui ne paroissent pas effrayés des difficultés qui s’y trouvent. Il faudroit un discours fort ample pour expliquer bien distinctement ce que je pense là dessus; cependant voicy quelques considerations: Si l’essence du corps consistoit dans l’etendue, la seule etendue devroit suffire pour rendre raison de toutes les affections du corps. Mais cela n’est point. Nous remarquons dans la matiere une qualité, que quelques uns ont appellée l’Inertie Naturelle, par laquelle le corps resiste en quelque façon au mouvement, en sorte qu’il faut employer quelque force pour l’y mettre (faisant mêmes abstraction de la pesanteur) et qu’un grand corps est plus difficilement ebranslé qu’un petit corps. Par exemple fig. (1), si le corps A en mouvement rencontre le corps B en repos, il est clair que si le corps B estoit indifferent au mouvement ou au repos, il se laisseroit pousser du corps A sans luy resister et sans diminuer la vistesse et changer la direction du corps A; et apres le concours A continueroit son chemin et B iroit avec lui de compagnie en le devançant. Mais il n’en est pas ainsi dans la nature; plus le corps B est grand, plus diminuerat-il la vistesse avec laquelle vient le corps A, jusqu’à l’obliger même de reflechir, si B est plus grand qu’A. Or s’il n’y avoit dans les corps que l’etendue ou la situation, c’est à dire ce que les Geometres y connoissent joint à la seule notion du changement, cette etendue seroit entierement indifferente à l’egard de ce changement, et les resultats du concours des corps s’expliqueroient par la seule composition Geometrique des mouvemens, c’est à dire le corps apres le concours iroit tousjours d’un mouvement composé de l’impression qu’il avoit avant le choc et de celle qu’il recevroit du corps concourant. Pour ne le pas empecher, c’est à dire en cas de rencontre, il iroit avec la difference de deux vistesses
et du costé de la direction du plus viste, comme la velocité 2A3A ou 2B3B dans la figure (2) cy jointe est la difference entre 1A2A et 1B2B. Et en cas d’atteinte dans le cas Fig. (3), lorsque le plus promt atteindroit un plus lent qui le devance, le plus lent recevroit la vistesse de l’autre, et generalement ils iroient tousjours de compagnie apres le concours, et particulierement comme j’ay dit au commencement, celuy qui est en mouvement, emporteroit avec luy celuy qui est en repos, sans recevoir aucune diminution de vistesse, et sans qu’en tout cecy la grandeur, égalité ou inegalité des deux corps puisse rien changer, ce qui est entierement irreconciliable avec les experiences. Et quand on supposeroit que la grandeur doit faire un changement au mouvement, l’on n’auroit point de principe pour determiner le moyen de l’estimer en detail, pour sçavoir la direction et la vistesse resultante. En tout cas, on pancheroit à l’opinion de la conservation du mouvement, au lieu que je crois avoir demonstré que la même force se conserve, et qu’elle est differente de la quantité du mouvement. Tout cela fait connoistre, qu’il y a dans la matiere quelque autre chose que ce qui est purement Geometrique, c’est à dire que l’etendue et son changement tout nud. Et à le bien considerer, on s’apperçoit qu’il y faut joindre quelque notion superieure ou metaphysique, sçavoir celle de la substance, action et force, et ces notions portent que tout ce qui patit, doit agir reciproquement, et tout ce qui agit, doit patir quelque reaction, et par consequent un corps en repos ne doit estre emporté par un autre en mouvement, sans changer quelque chose de la direction et vistesse de l’agent. Quoyque je demeure d’accord que tout corps est etendu, et qu’il n’y a point d’etendue sans corps, il ne faut pas neantmoins confondre les notions du lieu ou espace ou de l’etendue toute pure avec les notions de la substance, qui outre l’etendue renferme aussi la resistence, c’est à dire l’action et passion. Cette consideration me paroist importante non seulement pour connoistre la nature de la substance étendue, mais aussi pour ne pas mepriser dans la physique les principes superieurs et immateriels au prejudice de la pieté. Car quoyque je sois persuadé que tout se fait mecaniquement dans la nature corporelle, je ne laisse pas de croire aussi, que les principes mêmes de la mecanique, c’est à dire les premieres loix du mouvement ont une origine plus sublime que celle que les pures mathematiques peuvent fournir. Et je m’imagine que si cela estoit plus connu, ou mieux consideré, bien des personnes de pieté n’auroient pas si mauvaise opinion de la philosophie corpusculaire, et les philosophes modernes joindroient mieux la connoissance de la nature avec celle de son auteur. Je ne m’etends pas sur d’autres raisons touchant la nature du corps, car cela me meneroit trop loin.
Comme M. le Baron Bodeni m’avoit demandé mes raisons sur quelque chose de semblable que je luy avois dit, je vous supplie, Monsieur, de lui faire part de ce raisonnement, et sur tout de l’examiner, car je defere tant au vostre que je souhaitterois d’en pouvoir jouir tant sur cecy que sur d’autres matieres. Les affaires ne sont pas tout à fait comme on le souhaiteroit; les couronnes du Nord veuillent profiter du commerce par une neutralité, qui leur pourroit couster cher, car elles aident la France à sortir de ce mauvais pas, elle ne se souciera gueres d’eux un autre fois. Le Roy Guillaume fait ce qu’on doit attendre d’un grand prince, mais il ne trouve pas partout le même zele. Il est porté à faire faire des efforts en faveur du Duc de Savoye; si cela se fait à temps, l’Italie peutestre sera obligée de prendre part à la guerre, ce qui servira à soulager Allemagne un peu. L’Empereur pense principalement aux affaires de la Hongrie, et je trouve qu’il a raison, pourveu qu’il puisse forcer les Turcs à une paix raisonnable, et revenir au Rhin à temps. Je vous supplie de faire part quelques fois de ce que l’inquisition et la congregation de l’indice publient sur les livres, dogmes ou matieres semblables. Et je suis, Monsieur, etc.
- 1Das Original dieses Schreibens ist unter den Leibnizischen Papieren nicht vorhanden. - Aus der Vorbemerkung kann man schließen, daß dieses Schreiben Clarke's erst nach Leibnizens Tode abgefaßt ist.
- 1Ein Wort unleserlich.
- 1Unter diesem angenommenen Namen lebte der Freiherr von Bodenhausen als Erzieher des Erbprinzen von Toskana in Florenz.