DAMARIS LADY MASHAM AN LEIBNIZ

S^r Oates 8 August 1704.

Whatever Am Kopf der Seite von Leibniz' Hand: resp. allowances are to be made for the Language of Civilitie to Ladys, differing but little from what would look like Flatterie to one of your own Sex; Yet I find a Pleasure in being Prais'd by You, which I Justifie to my self from a Beleefe that when you Honour me with such Expressions of your good opinion, You make me the Best return in Your power for that well Grounded Esteeme I have for You, by a Desire which That has created in You of finding me Worthy of Yours. Nor shall I ever reckon it a small matter if I have Desert enough to engage Those of a distinguish'd Merit to wish that I had more. Thus, if I do flatter my self, I am by a Vanitie but very little moderated, or rather Refin'd beyond that of Others, pleas'd with the favorable things you say of me, without that Cruel allay attending this Satisfaction which a Consciousness of not resembl'ing the Picture you have made for me must otherwise give me.

Whether I have rightly represented Your Systeme You Best can tell: and what you say on that Subject I am proud of; Whilst the Inferences you would draw from thence to my advantage can give me onely a Due acknowledgment for your wishing me so much fitter for your Correspondence than I am. But however justly I may have express'd your Sense so far as I indeavour'd to represent it, your Answers to some of my Enquiries makes me question whether I fully apprehend All that is included in your Hypothesis. For I do not yet sufficiently see upon what you ground Organism's being Essential to Matter: or indeed very well understand your Meaning in these Words That Organisme is not absolutely Essential to Matter but to Matter *arrangée par une Sagesse Souveraine*. What you would Build upon this, Forms a very Transcendant Conception of the Divine Artifice; and such as I think could onely occur to the thoughts of one possess'd with the highest admiration of the Wisdome of his Maker: But if you infer the Truth of this Notion onely from its being the most Agreable one that you can Frame to that Attribute of God, this, Singly, seemes to me not to be Concludeing: Since we can, in my opinion, onely infer from thence that whatsoever God dos must be according to infinite Wisdome: but are not able with our short and narrow Views to determine what the operations of an Infinitely Wise Being must be.

The Principle of Action call'd by you Force Primitive is you say a Substance: of the which, I still perceive not the positive Idea Perception being but the Action of this Substance: what you add concerning its Perceptions, in these words, ~~suivant l'Analogie~~ qu'elle doit avoir avec notre ame, makes me again beleeve that I do not fully understand your scheme: since I thought before that the Soul and this Force Primitive, or Principle of Action, had been the same thing. You say renfermer les Ames dans les Dimensions *c'est Vouloir imaginer les ames comme des corps*. in regard of Extension this is True; and Extension is to me, inseparable from the notion of All Substance. I am yet sensible That we ought not to reject Truths because they are not Imaginable by us (where there is Ground to admit them). But Truth being but the attributeing certain affections conceiv'd to belong to the subject in question. I can by no meanes attribute any thing to a subject whereof I have no Conception at all; as I am Conscious to my self I have not of Unextended Substance. What you instance in therefore of Lines Incommensurable seemes not to me to answer the Case; for I herein do conceive the Proposition, and have Cleare Ideas of Lines Incommensurable, thō I do not see the reason of theire Incommensurabilitie: but of an unextended substance I have not any Conception, from whence I can affirm, or Deny, any thing concerning it.

Why you think that theire is no Created Substance Complete without Extension: or that the Soul (which you suppose a distinct substance) would without the Body be a Substance Incompleat without Extension, I understand not: but my owne Beleefe that there is no Substance whatever Unextended is (as I have alreadie said), grounded upon this that I have no Conception of such a thing. I cannot yet but Conceive two very different Substances to be in the Universe, thō Extension alike agrees to them Both. For I clearly conceive an Extension without Soliditie, and a solid Extension: to some system of which last if it should be affirm'd that God did annex Thought, I see no absurditie in this from there being Nothing in Extension and Impenetrabilitie or Soliditie, from whence thought can naturally, or by a train of Causes be deriv'd; the which I Beleeve to be Demonstrable it cannot be. But That was never suppos'd by me; and my Question in the case would be This: Whether God could not as conceivably by us as create an unextended Substance, and then unite it to an Extended substance (wherin, by the way, there is methinks on your Side two difficulties for one) Whether God, I say, could not as conceivably by us as his Doing This would be, Add (if he so Pleas'd) the Power of Thinking to that Substance which has Soliditie. Soliditie and Thought being both of them but attributes of some unknown Substance and I see not why it may not be one and the same which is the common Support of Both These; there appearing to me no contradiction in a so existence of Thought and Soliditie in the same Substance. Neither can I apprehend it to be more Inexplicable That God should give Thought to a Substance which I know not, but whereof I know some of its attributes, than to another, suppos'd, Substance of whose very Being I have no Conception at all. and that any Substance whatsoever should have Thought belonging to it, or resulting from it, otherwise than as God has Will'd it shall have so, I cannot Apprehend.

That God dos in Frameing and Ordening of all his Works always make use of the most simple meanes I doubt not, this appearing to me most sutable to his Wisdome, but whether, or no, these simple meanes or methods are always such as Surpass not a Created intelligence, I do not know: but am very apt to Beleeve That Gods Ways are Past our finding out, in this sense.

I have no sooner scribled to you these Thoughts of mine, than I feare Wearying You by my Dulness. I shall therefore Wave takeing notice of any thing more that has occur'd to me in Considering the several parts of your letter; or makeing any such farther inquiries as perhaps were there resolv'd, I might be able in some measure to cleare to my self. I will however now mention to you one difficultie (as I conceive) in your Hypothesis, which I think not that I could ever extricate it from without your assistance, and it is to me a very material one. Viz how to reconcile your Systeme to Libertie or Free Agencie: for thō in regard of any Compulsion from other Causes, we are according thereto Free, yet I see not how we can be so in respect of the first Mover. This I omitted takeing notice of in my last not onely because I thought it too remote an inquiry for one who wanted to be inlighten'd concerning the very foundation you Built upon: but also because I must acknowledge that I cannot make out Libertie either With, or Without any Hypothesis Whatsoever. Thō as being persuaded that I feel myself a Free Agent, and that Freedome to Act is necessarie to our being Accountable for our Actions, I not onelie conclude we are indu'd therewith, but am very tenacious hereof: whence I should be sorry to find from any new Hypothesis new difficulties in maintaining of this. I think not much that I need seek to Justifie to you the part which I own my Inclination has in this Opinion; since what you have said in Print persuades me that you have the same Beleef with the same Bias. I might else perhaps, alledge (in my excuse at least), that as I am a True English Woman, I cannot but naturally have a Passion for Libertie in All senses wherein I consider it: and I would not have so Much as the Philosophy of Hanover Unfavourable to any Kind of it.

What you write on the subject of M^r Locke's health, he is much oblig'd by: and I am no less so when You recommend to me the care of one of the Best Friends I have in the World as a matter in which you interess your self. If I could contribute to the Prolonging so Valuable a Life as his, I should think this one of the best uses I could ever make of my own. He is not onely still with me, but in all Probabilitie will never have health enough to permit him the thoughts of Leaving any more a place which he has made Agreable to Others by haveing for many years chosen to spend therein a great Part of his Time. Rational Conversation, with Mutual Good Will, has the greatest Charmes that I know in Life, and I have hitherto been very Happy in respect of that Enjoyment. To my Felicitie in which kind I think it a considerable addition to be Honour'd with Your Correspondence at such a Distance, and that I am allow'd to assure you of my being with great Esteeme

S^r Your Most Humble Servant Da Masham.