DAMARIS LADY MASHAM AN LEIBNIZ

S^r Oates 3 June 1704.

Your great Civilitie Obliges me not the less for haveing presum'd from your Goodness upon more than I had any Right to Pretend to when I requested you would give your Self the Pains of informing me farther concerning your Hypothesis.

To a Mind Possess'd in any measure with a Due Admiration of the works of God Nothing is more Gratefull than by farther discoveries therein of his Divine Perfections, to be sensibly engag'd to Adore that Being which Reason pronounces ought to be the supreme Object of our Affections.

An Hypothesis thought by your self and others conduceing to such an End as this, could not but excite my enquirie; and it did so the more because that in reading what you have publish'd, it seem'd to my self also you had views there in which gave a very Becomeing Idea of the Wisedome of God in his Works. The letter you have favour'd me with confirms me in this Thought: but that I may be sure of haveing a certain and cleare knōledge of your Hypothesis permit me to tell you what I conceive it to be; in hopes you will rectifie my Mistakes if I am in any; which is what may easilie happen to one so little conversant as I am in such Speculations.

You take for granted that there is a Simple Being in us indu'd with Action and Perception. The same, you say, differing onely in the manner of Perception, is in matter everie where. That that Simple Being in us, which is call'd Soul is distinguish'd from that of Beasts (and yet more from that of other Bodys about us) by the Power of Abstraction and frameing thereby Universal Ideas. All these Simple Beings you think have; Always will have; and ever since they existed have had, Organick Bodys, proportion'd to theire Perception. So that not onely after Death the Soul dos remain, but even the Animal also. Generation, and Death, being but a displaying or Concealment of these Beings to, or from our view. The same Principle of Uniformitie in the Works of Nature which has led you to beleeve this has, you say, led you also to your Systeme of the Harmonie Preestablish'd betweene Substances. the which I thus understand.

Any Action of the soul upon Matter, or of Matter upon the Soul is Inconceivable: These two have theire Laws distinct. Bodies follow the Laws of Mechanisme, and have a tendencie to change suivant les Forces Mouvantes. Souls produce in themselves Internal Actions and have a tendencie to change according to the Perception that they have of Good or Ill. Now Soul and Body, following each theire Proper Laws, and neither of them acting thereby upon, or Affecting the other, such Effects are yet produc'd from a Harmonie Preetablish'd betwixt these Substances, as if there was a real communication betweene them. So that the Body acting constantly by its owne Laws of Mechanisme without receiving any Variation or change therein from any Action of the Soul dos yet always correspond to the Passions and Perceptions which the Soul hath. And the Soul, in like Manner, thō not operated upon by the Motions of Matter, has yet at the same time that the Body Acts according to its Laws of Mechanisme, certain Perceptions or Modifications which fail not to answer thereunto.

This is what I conceive you to say; in which (to tell you Thoughts so insignificant as mine) I see nothing, Peculiar, which seems not possible. I find a Uniformitie in it which pleases me: and the Advantages propos'd from this Hypothesis are very desirable. But it appears not yet to me that This is more than an Hypothesis; for as Gods ways are not limited by our Conceptions; the unintelligibleness or inconceivablness by us of any way but one, dos not, methinks, much induce a Beleefe of that, being the way which God has chosen to make use of. Yet such an inference as this from our Ignorance, I remember P. Malbranche (or some other assertor of his Hypothesis) would make in behalf of Occasional Causes: to which Hypothesis, amongst other exceptions, I think there is one, which I cannot, without your help, see, but that yours is alike liable to and that is, from the Organization of the Body: wherin all that Nice Curiositie that is discoverable seeming Useless: becomes Superfluous and lost labour. To this difficultie likewise let me add that I conceive not why Organisme should be, or can be thought, as you say is, Essential to Matter.

But these enquiries, or others, that might it may be on further thoughts occur to me, are less pertinent for me to make, than such a one as is more fundamental, althō it dos not peculiarly respect your Hypothesis.

Forms, explain'd by you to signifie Simple Beings, you elsewhere call Atomes des *Substances, and ~~Forces Primitives,~~* the Nature whereof you, in another place, say, you find to Consist in Force.

Force, I presume cannot be the essence of any Substance, but is the attribute of what you call a Form, Soul or *Atome de Substance,* of the essence whereof I find no positive Idea, and your negation of theire haveing any Dimensions, makes theire Existence, I confess, inconceivable to me; as not being able to conceive an existence of that which is No Where. If the Localitie of these Substances were accounted for by theire being as you [say] they are always in Organiz'd Bodies, then they are somewhere: But if these *Atomes des Substances* are somewhere then they must have some extension, which you deny of them: who, I think, also place the Union of the Soul with its respective Body in nothing else but that correspondence or conformitie whereby, in virtue of a Preestablish'd Harmonie, Souls and Bodys, Acting apart, each by theire owne laws, the same effects are produc'd as if theire was a real Communication betwixt them. Thō whether, or no, I perfectly comprehend your meaning in this part I am in doubt.

What I have here said I think enough for me to venture to trouble you with at once: and it will perhaps be more than enough to show you that you have judg'd by much too favorably of my Apprehension. For I remember my Father as well as other Assertors of Unextended Substance to have said That it is an imposition of Imagination upon theire Reason in Those who cannot be convinc'd of the realitie of substances unextended. So great Authoritie as His was to me could not hinder me, if this be so, from being always under such an influence of Imagination; which is what would not willingly be in any case. But wherever I have no Idea of a thing; or Demonstration of the Truth of any Proposition[,] the Truth of which is inconceivable by me, I cannot, and conclude that I ought not to assent to what is asserted of either: since should I once do this I know not where I should stop; what should be the Boundaries of Assent. Or why I might not Beleeve alike one thing as well as another.

M^r Locke Presents you his humble service, and desires me to tell you He takes himself to be mightilie oblig'd to you for your great Civilitie express'd to him; in which he finds you a master as well as in Philosophy and every thing else. His want of Health he says now, and the little remains he counts he has of Life, has put an end, to his enquiries into Philosophical Speculations: thō if he were still in the heat of that Pursuit he could not be so Ignorant of You or Himself as to take upon him to be the Judge of what you have well consider'd: much less to be the Instructor of a man of your knowne extraordinarie Parts and merit. He takes it for a great Honour done him, that you have Condescended to read and consider, as you say, his Essay upon the understanding and that you think it worth the while by your Larger Views to remove some difficulties, and supply some defects that are therein. This if he had any other end in publishing that Treatise but some small service to Truth and Knōledge, would flatter his vanitie. That it would be Preserv'd to Posteritie by the touches of so Great a Master: by whose Hand it would be redeem'd from some of its own Imperfections.

All M^r Lockes Freinds have at present the greife to apprehend that They shall enjoy the Happyness of his Freindship but a little time: the infirmitie of Ill Lungs dayly increaseing upon him, in an Age that is considerable.

I am much Pleas'd S^r to have made you a Present, that is both acceptable to you, and that can possibly contribute any thing to your inriching the world by the effects of your Meditations. If you shall think me Worthy of your Instruction; or at any time of any Communication of your Thoughts I shall always (as I ought to do) look upon it as a condescention in you which will oblige me to be with the greatest acknowledgment as well as Esteeme

S^r Your Most Humble Servant Da Masham.